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BUSINESS AS USUAL IN A "DOLLAR
DEMOCRACY*: A REVIEW OF BUSINESSRELATED CASES IN THE 1998-1999 SUPREME
COURT TERM
Barbara K. Bucholtzt

I. INTRODUCTION
With respect to business-related cases, the 1998-1999 term of the Supreme
Court provided little in the way of surprises. That view may appear counterintuitive, given the Court's headline-grabbing rulings on ADA discrimination' and
on federalism.2 However, the groundwork for those high-profile decisions was laid
in the Court's recent precedent.' Thus, the big news of these cases is essentially old
news. This Court continues to be pre-eminently a Rehnquist Court: conservative,

-. The concept of a "dollar democracy" is taken from Ferdinand Lundberg, AMERICA'S SixrY FAMnMm (New
York: The Vanguard Press, 1937), quoted in T.H. WATKINS, RIGHTEOUS PILGRIM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
HAROLD IcKES 628 (1990). It is meant to suggest a societal dichotomy, endemic to the United States, in which
the egalitarian precepts of democracy are countervailed by the hegemonic influences of capitalism. In the words
of Lundberg, a "modem industrial oligarchy... dominates the United States, functioning discreetly under a dejure
democratic form of government behind which a dejfacto government, ... plutocratic in its lineaments, has
gradually taken form since the Civil War. ... It is the government of money in a dollar democracy." Id. (Many
thanks to Professor Gary Allison for calling my attention to Watkins' excellent book. This article highlights some
of the major cases and trends in last term's decisions. A complete list of the 1998-1999 business related cases is
provided at Appendices A and B which follow this article).
t. Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. American with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §121 et. seq., construed this term in: Albertson's Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,119 S. Ct 2162 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795,
119 S. Ct 1597 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Sutton v.
United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct 2139 (1999); Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,
119 S. Ct. 391o(1998).
2. For a discussion of the term's ADA cases, see infra notes 19-49 and accompanying text. See Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S.666, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) and its companion case, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756 (D.N.J. 1996). For a discussion of the term's federalism cases
see infra notes 201-20 and accompanying text.
3. For example, the Court signaled its states' rights proclivities at least as early as 1992. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.
Ct. 1114 (1996); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 117 S. Ct. 2157(1997). For a discussion of the precursors to this term's federalism cases, see infra notes 20109 and accompanying text.
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to be sure, and with the exception of the federalism cases, generally cohesive and
constrained. 4

The Rehnquist template can be seen statistically by its consistent ability to
achieve a 40% or greater unanimity of result in decisions since 199 . In the 19981999 term, that percentage was 44%.6 More significantly, the Rehnquist Court
profile is evident in the doctrinal result reached and the analytical approach taken
in the overwhelming majority of business-related opinions last term. A panoramic
view of the business cases on the docket reveals a characteristically "Rehnquistian"
Court: maintaining a moderately pro-business position on substantive issues and
with the exception of the federalism cases7 exhibiting a clear preference for
reaching results by skillful use of technical statutory construction and interpretation
of precedent. Of the big news cases covering employment discrimination and
federalism, the employment discrimination cases were, on balance, good news for
the business community, while the federalism cases and the other cases that

implicate business interests cut both ways for the business community.
II. EMPLOYMENT CASES
Viewing the term's most important business-related cases from the perspective

of various business interests, it is apparent that employment issues dominated the
docket numerically. Of the seventy-five cases decided last term, thirty-seven were

business-related, and of that number, almost one-third, twelve, involved employment issues.
A. ADA Decisions
Of the employment cases, the most well-publicized decisions were indisputably the disability cases. In last term's three most highly publicized disability

4. For an excellent commentary on the development of an image of a restraintist Court by the cases it selects,
see Professor Douglas Kmiec's remarks following the 1997-1998 term, which was perhaps its most technocratic:
What better way to manifest a narrower, more constrained role for the judiciary than to select cases inscrutable to
the general public?... In a way, it's saying if you really think this is the least dangerous branch of government,
then it should play its role with a decidedly lower profile than the selected branches, and so it will confine itself
to clarifying difficulties in statutory enactments ....
Quoted in Marcia Coyle, Ok, Let'sAll Go to the Right, NAT'LL. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B7. (in reference to selecting
cases that call forthatkind of ostensibly technical resolution). See also myremarks, following the 1995-1996 term,
that to some extent the profile of a distinctly Rehnquist Court has been developed by its case selection, and that,
"In the long run, a retrospective of the business-related cases the Court chose to reject may be the best mechanism
for... [evaluating it]." Barbara K. Bucholtz, Taking Care of Business: A Review of Business-RelatedCases in
the 1995-1996 Supreme Court Term, 32 TULSALJ. 449 (1997).
5. See NAT'L L., Aug. 16, 1999, at B14. The Journalreports that the percentages of unanimity and
unanimity of result with concurrence in reasoning since 1991 are: 1992-1993 term 43%; 1993-1994 term: 40%;
1994-1995 term: 44%; 1995-1996 term: 48%; 1996-1997 term: 43%; 1997-1998 term: 48%; 1998-1999 term:
44%. The most notable exception to this "Rehnquistian Consensus" was the mere plurality garnered for the
federalism cases.
6. See id.
7. The notions of dual sovereignty and states' rights that inform the Court's emerging federalism doctrine rest
on more theoretical underpinnings. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
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decisions, the Court made it clear that its 1997-1998 decisions with regard to sexual
harassment in the workplace did not signal a wholesale adoption of the liberal
agenda with regard to employment discrimination.' A more accurate portrait of the
Court's position on employment discrimination can be drawn by viewing its 19971998 workplace sexual harassment cases in tandem with its 1998-1999 workplace
disability cases. Taken together these cases evince an affinity for the status quo.
They neither express nor intimate any inclination to reverse or to expand existing
precedent.
Recall that during the 1997-1998 term, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services9 held that Title VII protections extend to same-sex sexual
harassment in the workplace.1" In Farragherv. City of Boca Raton" and in
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth12 the Court clarified the standards applicable to
employer vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases.13 In Oubre v. Energy
Operations,Inc.,14 the Court declared that a signed release did not foreclose an
employee's age discrimination claims against her employer."i Finally, in the
Bragdon v. Abbott 6 case, the Court held that an employer who tested positive for
HIV was protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). 7 These 19971998 cases seemed to give employers a clear signal that the Rehnquist Court did not
intend to roll back the liberal approach of its more liberal predecessors to workplace
discrimination. To that extent, the Rehnquist's conservative Court proved itself to
be only moderately pro-business.
However, at first blush, three blockbuster discrimination cases this term
appear to send a very different message. On June 22, 1999 the Court issued three
opinions which precluded expansion of ADA language and precedent to cover
several types of disabilities. 8 In Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc., 9 the Court held
that the statutory standard for ADA protection: that the employee show a "physical
substantially limit[ing] one or more of the major life
or mental impairment ...
activities,"'2 be read to include any devices or medication that ameliorate the
debilitating effects of the impairment. 2 ' Therefore, myopia that can be corrected
with prescription glasses is not an ADA-covered impairment.22 Thus, the fact that
an employer in Sutton rejected a myopic individual did not state ajusticiable claim

8. See Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999); Albertson's Inc., v. Kirkingburg,
527 U. S. 555, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
9. 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998).

10. See generally id.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998).
524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
See Farragher, 524 U.S. 775; see also Burlington, 524 U.S. 742.
522 U.S. 422, 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
See id. at 840.
524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).

17. See id. at 2206-07.
18. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Albertson's Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133

(1999).
19. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
21. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-49.
22. See id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 3

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:485

because "the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others
and to establish physical criteria ...
" as job qualifications. 3
InAlbertsons Inc., v. Kirkingburg,24 the Court extended its reasoning in Sutton
and decided that individuals whose impairments do not, in fact, significantly limit
their capacities because they can in some way compensate for the impairments, are
also not per se covered by the Act.' In Albertsons, Kirkingburg's visual impairment in one eye was compensated by his ability to see with his other eye? 6 His
impairment did not preclude him from performing the major life activity of seeing;
he simply performed it differently.' Monocular vision alone, then, will not qualify
an individual for ADA protection. 8
In order to qualify, a claimant must also show the extent to which the
impairment significantly restricts major life activities.2 9 Furthermore, the Court
extended its position in Sutton with regard to an employer's right to establish job
qualification preferences. The Court declared that an employer who adopts a
federal standard (in this case, a vision standard)30 as a job qualification is not
obligated to adopt any waiver programs available under the standard as well.3
The third case in this ADA triad, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,32
again extended the Court's reasoning in Sutton and announced that the ADA was
unavailable to disabled individuals unless they could show that their impairment
disqualified them from a broad range of jobs, not simply a particular job.3 Thus,
an individual with high blood pressure who could not meet the specific job
qualifications for a mechanic at UPS (because that job required him to meet
standards for driving commercial vehicles) was not covered by the Act. "At most,"
said the Court, "petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the
job of mechanic only when that job requires... [him to drive] ...a specific type
of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce."34
Three cases in last term's docket, then, refused to extend the reach of ADA
protections to milder, less egregious impairments.
These cases were,

23. Id. at 2150-52.
24. 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999).
25. See d. at 2169-70.
26. See id. at 2169.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Department of Transportation's Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 CFR § 391.41(b)(10) (1998), cited
in Albertson's, 119 S.Ct. at 2169-72.
31. See Albertson's, 119 S. Ct. at 2172. The waiver program at issue was deemed by the Court not a
modification of the visual standards but as an experiment to test the efficacy of the standards. See id. at 2174.
32. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
33. See id. at 2133.
34. Id. at2138-39.
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understandably, greeted by the business community with some relief.3" The
remaining ADA cases on the Court's docket, however, were not so reassuring.
For instance, in Wright v. Universal Maritime,36 the Court overruled the
famously conservative Fourth Circuit 7 and held that a general arbitration clause in

a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not require an employee to arbitrate

his ADA claim nor did it preclude him from bringing suit under it. 8 Also, in
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,39 the Court permitted an ADA
petitioner to explain the inconsistency between her assertion of total disability, in
claiming eligibility for Social Security benefits, and her apparently conflicting

statement in her ADA petition that her disability could be reasonably
accommodated.'
Hence, the widely-publicized ADA cases were not an unqualified "win" for
the business community." Three cases favored business interests, while two ADA
cases protected employee interests. A similar dichotomy of results can be seen in
the remaining employment cases.
B. Civil Rights Statutes
The Court decided three employment cases under the Civil Rights Statutes

which were not entirely good news for business interests. The most far-reaching of

those cases was a Title VII case, Kolstad v. American DentalAssociation.42 At issue
in Kolstadwere the provisions of the 1992 Act which amended the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 and, for the first time, made punitive damages available in a Title VII
case. 43 The Court held that for a punitive damage award something more than proof

of intentional discrimination by the employer must be shown, but it declined to

35. Steven Bokat, general counsel for the United States Chamber of Commerce opined, "The great fear [in ADA
cases] was a dramatic expansion in lawsuits, with a lot of people without clearly defined disabilities clearly
empowered to seek legal relief .... That was very, very scary for employers." Robin Toner & Leslie Kaufman,
Ruling Upsets Advocatesfor the Disabled,N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999 at A22. A partner with the law firm that
represents United Parcel, a party-defendant in one of the cases (Murphy)echoed that sentiment: "It provides a
greater certainty for business people .... And it allows everyone to bring the focus back to the truly disabled." Id.
On the other hand, the decisions were deeply troubling to the disabled community and some of the drafters and
supporters of the ADA. This same articlereports thatProf. Chai Feldblum of Georgetown Law School commented,
"Where it leaves the ADA is with a huge gaping hole right at its heart." Id. And Christopher Bell, former counsel
for the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) cautions, "Employers need to be careful not to leap
to the conclusion that anyone taking medication is no longer covered .... This raises the bar for disability coverage,
but it really only means that truly disabled people can make a claim." Id.
36. 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
37. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, A CourtBecomes a Model of ConservativePursuits,N.Y. TIMEs, May 24, 1999,
at Al.
38. 119 S. Ct. at 394-97. Notably, this case did not require the Court to address the discrepancies between
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974) and Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) because the validity of a union-negotiated waiver of an employee's
right to bring his/her claim to a federal forum was not raised in Wright where there was no waiver. See Wright,
119 S. Ct. at 394-95.
39. 526 U.S. 795, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
40. See id. at 1602-04.
41. For a more comprehensive analysis of these ADA cases, see, Vicki J. Limas, 35 TULSA L. J. (2000).
42. 527 U.S. 526, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
43. See id. at 2124.
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require that the employee prove egregious conduct independent of the employer's

state of mind. The terms "malice and reckless indifference"' in the 1991 Act refer
to the employer's state of mind and proof of the employer's awareness that it might

be acting in violation of federal law is a sufficiently egregious state of mind to
satisfy those terms.'
However, the Court pointedly added that the egregious state of mind, like the

discriminatory act of a co-worker supervisor or manager must be imputed to the
employer.'

Further, although common law agency principles are generally

available to impute co-worker and managerial malice to the employer,47 those
principles would be modified to provide an employer a defense premised on its

"good faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy.

'48

Kolstad cuts both

ways, giving employees more latitude in proving punitives while giving employers
who implement Title VII programs a safe harbor.49
In another civil rights case, Haddle v. Garrison,0 the Court expanded the

protections of the Civil Rights Conspiracy Statute5 ' to reach an at-will employee.52
In so doing, it explained that even though the at-will employee had no
Constitutionally protected property interest in his employment, his claim of
wrongful intimidation under §1985(2) was not foreclosed. "[T]he fact that
employment at-will is not 'property' for purposes of the Due Process Clause...

does not mean that loss of at-will employment may not 'injur[e] [petitioner] in his
person or property' for purposes of § 1985(2)." '
The at-will employee in Haddle claimed that he was terminated from his at-

will employment in retaliation for responding to a grand jury subpoena and agreeing
to testify against his employer in a Medicare fraud prosecution.5 4 The Court held

his claim was cognizable under §1985, the Civil Rights Conspiracy Statute.55

Nevertheless, while the Chief Justice - writing for a unanimous Court - did cite

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See iUL
See id at 2124-26.
See id at2126
See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2127-29.
See id at 2130
In one respect, at least, this case may prove more important in employment disecrimination law than the

previously cited triad of ADA cases because it paints with a brush covering a broader segment of discrimination
cases. Critical to the availability of these cases is the potential to prove and receive punitive damages since an
award of only compensatory damages often makes these cases financially unviable. Another interesting aspect of
the case is that it is one of seven cases brought by, or against, nonprofit mutual benefit associations. See e.g.
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33,119 S. Ct. 292 (1998); California Dental Assoc. v. F.T.C., 526
U.S. 756, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999); Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 119 S. Ct.
1923 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999); United States v. SunDiamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999); and Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. v. Smith,
525 U.S. 459, 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999). Whether or not the presence of seven nonprofit associations as parties on
a single Supreme Court docket is a record, it is certainly indicative of the more proactive role currently played by
non-profits in the economy and in society-at-large.
50. 525 U.S. 121, 119 S. Ct. 489 (1998).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1994).
52. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492.
53. See id. at 489, 492.
54. See id. at 490.
55. See idat 492.
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traditional tort law claims of third party interference with at-will employment
relationships as authority for the holding,56 the decision was obviously driven by
public policy considerations supporting the integrity of the judicial system. The
decision is probably, therefore, sui generisand not a clarion call for an expansion
of at-will employee rights.
Employee property interests did not fare so well in the third civil rights
employment case. In AmericanManufacturersMutual InsuranceCo. v. Sullivan,5"
employees challenged workers compensation state law procedures under § 1983.58
Pennsylvania's worker compensation law required employers subject to the Act to
pay all "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment costs of a valid claim, but
it also created a review procedure under which a consortium of private health care
providers could evaluate the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment sought.59
Employees claimed that once their workers compensation claims were deemed
valid, the costs associated with the claims amounted to property rights.6 ° The
review procedure deprived them of a property right to treatment and that act of
deprivation was committed under color of state law. 6 In essence, the employees
sought to extend the reach of Justice Brennan's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly,62
which identified a Constitutionally-mandated right to pre-deprivation notice and
hearing in federal welfare assistance cases, to the workers compensation arena.63
The Court distinguished the workers compensation procedures on two grounds
and held that the withholding of workers compensation awards pending review did
not create a § 1983 Goldberg-type claim.6' Section 1983 requires that claimants
prove they were "deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state
66
law."'65 The Court declared the facts in Sullivan met neither element of the section.
First, the Court ruled that the review board was not acting under color of state law
even though the alleged deprivation was caused by a procedure" 'created by the
State.' 67 The reviewing board consisted of private sector health care providers that
could not be considered "state actors" simply because the review procedure was
created by the State.68

56. See id.
57. 526 U.S. 40, 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
59. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 982.

60. See id. at 984-85.
61. See id.
62. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
63. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at982.
64. See id. at 987-90.
65. See id at 985.
66. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 986 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 985.(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Rehnquist applied the twopronged test for "under color of state law" requiring plaintiff to show "both an alleged constitutional deprivation
,caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State
or by a person for whom the State is responsible' and that 'the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor."' (emphasis added)).
68. See 119 S. Ct. at 985.
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Therefore, the withholding of medical treatment compensation pending review
did not operate under color of state law. 9 Second, the employees had no vested
property right in the medical treatment until the treatment was deemed "reasonable"
and "necessary" by the Board.7" Only at that point did the Pennsylvania statute at
issue create an entitlement to the treatment.7 Thus, Sullivan can be seen as a victory
for the business community, but overall, this term's civil rights cases cut both
ways. 72
C. ERISA
Two Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)" cases were
decided last term. In HughesAircraft Co. v Jacobson,7 4 a unanimous Court applied
textbook rules of statutory construction to find in favor of an employer and against
its retired employees.7 The plain meaning of the applicable sections of ERISA 76
made it abundantly clear, said the Court, that the employer did not violate ERISA
when it amended its retirement plan to provide for early retirement and to eliminate
mandatory employee contributions."
Pursuant to the Act, retirees whose
contributions had been mandatory under the previous plan had no vested property
interest in the current plan's unsegregated assets. 7' Furthermore, the retirees were
protected by the employer's obligation to pay the specified amount to which each
retiree was entitled. 79 A unanimous Court in UNUM Life Insurance Co. of
America v. Ward," however, found the ERISA provisions applicable to the facts in
that case somewhat opaque, thus requiring the Court to place the disputed language
of the statute in the factual context to which it would be applied.8 The UNUM
Court considered the statutory provision which saves from ERISA preemption any
state law that "regulates insurance,"8 2 and, placing the statutory language in the
context of the untimely claim for disability benefits at issue in UNUM, found that
California's "notice-prejudice" rule regulates insurance.83 Hence, it was saved from
ERISA preemption.' Consequently, the employee's untimely claim was saved from

69. See id. at 989.
70. See id. at 990.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., City of Monterey, v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1998)
(raising eminent domain issues and holding that whether the City denied all economically viable use of developer's
property when it rejected developer's proposal five times, and whether the city's rejection substantially advanced
a legitimate public purpose were properly jury questions. The case did not advance the development of Takings
jurisprudence significantly).
73. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1999).
74. 525 U.S. 432, 119 S. Ct. 755 (1999).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 762.
77. See generally id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
at 764.
80. 526 U.S. 358, 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999).
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 1386 (quoting§ 514 (b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1994)).

83. See UNUM, 119 S. Ct. at 1385.
84. See id.
at 1385, 1387-91.
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preclusion because the California law required the insurer to show that the
employee's belated notice of claim caused it actual prejudice.8 5
A related issue, however, did implicate ERISA's preemption clause86 and was
not "saved." 87 ERISA's preemption clause states in relevant part that ERISA "
'shall supercede ....
state laws to the extent that those laws 'related to any employee
88
benefit plan.'
At issue was a California agency rule 9 which provided that "' the
employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group
insurance policies."90 The Court found that the rule related to an employee benefit
plan because it affected its administration.9 1 The California rule was, therefore,
preempted by ERISA.92 Last term's ERISA cases, then, were quintessentially
"Rehnquistian:" delivering a mixed bag of results to the business community by
using traditional rules of statutory construction.
D. Health Law
The contiguous field of health law yielded even less favorable results for
business interests. The most important health law case last term was Humana,Inc.
v. Forsyth.93 In Humana, a unanimous Court held that RICO's 94 treble damage
award could be assessed against insurers in a successful fraud case.95 This
concession was premised upon its analysis of the McCarran-Ferguson Act96 which
provides in pertinent part that "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance ...unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance."'97
RICO does not relate to the business of insurance. But neither does it
"invalidate, impair or supercede" Nevada's insurance regulation laws. 9 Since
Nevada law "permits recovery of compensatory and punitive damages," RICO's
treble damage award is "in harmony with the state's regulation." 99 In Your Home
Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala,l " the Court deferred to the agency's

85. See id. at 1386.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

87. See UNUM, 119 S.Ct. at 1385.
88. See id. at 1384 (quoting § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1444(a) (1994)).
89. SeeUNUM, 119S. Ct. at 1391.
90. Id. (quoting Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 432 P.2d. 731, 737 (Cal. 1967) (en bane) (establishing

"Elfstrom rule").
91.
92.
93.
94.

SeeUNUM, 119 S.Ct. at 1392.
See id. at 1391.
525 U.S. 299, 119 S. Ct. 710 (1999).
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of 1978, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994 & Supp. IV

1998).
95. See Humana, 119 S.Ct. at 719.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Humana, 119 S. Ct. at 715 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994)).
Humana, 119 S.Ct. at 715.
See id.
at 714.
525 U.S. 429, 119 S. Ct. 930 (1999).
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interpretation of the Medicare Act101 in its regulations promulgated under the Act,1 02
finding that the reviewing board lacked jurisdiction to review an intermediate level
refusal to reopen the reimbursement determination at issue. 0 3 The Court's
deference was premised on its finding that the agency's interpretation was
reasonable"°4 and on the Court's straightforward reading of the applicable section
of the Medicare Act. The Court opined "judicial review under the federal-question
statute ... is precluded by 42 U.S.C. §405(h) [which is] applicable to the Medicare
Act by operation of §1395ii ......."'
The third health law case last term required an interpretation of the Emergency
Medical treatment and Active Labor Act. 6 In a per curiam decision, the Court
07
ruled in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia"
that a guardian's lawsuit on behalf of his
patient-ward alleging the patient's transfer from defendant hospital was premature,
stated a cognizable claim under the Act. 08 The Court reasoned the allegations were
cognizable because the relevant sections of the Act, 1" which required that hospitals
stabilize emergency patients before transferring them to other facilities, did not
require proof of the hospital's improper motive in failing to provide the requisite
emergency care.110 The failure to stabilize and the transfer were sufficient to give
rise to a claim.' Three up and three out. Health care providers lost all three health
law cases this term, with each case decided pursuant to traditional canons of
statutory construction.
E. Native AmericanAnd Energy Resource Law
Business interests fared substantially better in energy-related cases involving
Native American tribes. A divided Court inAmoco ProductionCo. v. Southern Ute
Indian Tribe, 2 applied the "plain meaning" of the term "coal," as it was understood
at the time the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 19101 were passed and found that
Congress reserved only the hard rock coal under the Acts." 4 Thus, when Congress
subsequently conveyed the surface and other mineral rights, its reservation of coal
rights did not include the coal bed methane gas imbedded in the coal." 5 The Court
stated that in the early 20 t' Century, methane gas "was considered a dangerous
waste product which escaped from coal;""' 6 its value as an energy source was not
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1935 (1994).
102. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885 (1998).

103. See generally Your Home, 119 S. Ct. 930.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 934.
See id.
TheEmergency Medical Treatment and ActiveLaborAct, 42 U.S.C.
525 U.S. 249, 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (per curium).

§ 1395

dd (1994 & Supp. Il 1997).

108. See generally id.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 dd(b)-(d) (1994 & Supp. 111997).
See generally Roberts, 119 S. Ct. 685.
See id. at 686.
526 U.S. 865, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1727 (citing Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 81, 83-85 (1994)).
See generally Amoco Production Co., 119 S. Ct. at 1719.

115. See id.
116. See id. at 1725.
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recognized. Some of the surface lands and mineral rights conveyed under the 1909
and 1910 Acts were formerly Southern Ute reservation lands." 7 The federal
government eventually returned its reserved rights in those lands to the Ute tribe."'
Thereafter, energy companies entered into leases with owners of the surface
and residual mineral interests to extract the coal bed methane gas from the coal." 9
It was the ownership of this energy resource that was at issue in the instant case.
The tribe claimed that it owned the gas as a part of its interest in the coal. 2 ' The
Court held that Congress did not intend to reserve the gas which it believed in 19091910 to be valueless; hence no interest in the gas devolved to the tribe when the
2
hard rock coal interest was returned to the Utes.1 1
In the other energy resource case involving a Native American tribe, the Court
also found in favor of the energy industry and against the tribe. In El PasoNatural
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 22 a unanimous Court refused to apply the doctrine of tribal
court exhaustion to a case involving injuries allegedly caused by exposure to
radioactive materials."2 The materials were in open pit uranium mines located on
the Navajo Nation Reservation.' 24 Injured tribal members filed suit in tribal court.
The uranium mining companies sought to enjoin the tribal litigation and to try the
case in federal district court. 25 The companies argued that a 1988 amendment to
the Price-Anderson Act'26 granted federal district courts original jurisdiction in all
cases implicating the Act. 27 The Court agreed, holding that Price-Anderson's
"unusual pre-emption provision" precludes consideration of the exhaustion doctrine
because it expresses Congress' "unmistakable preference for a federal forum...
both for litigating a Price-Anderson claim on the merits and for determining
whether a claim falls under Price-Anderson when removal [here, from tribal court]
is contested."' 28 Statutory construction worked in favor of the energy industry in
those two cases.

117. Seeid.
11S. See id.

119. See id.
120. See Amoco Production Co., at 1722-23.
121. See id. at 1727. Notably, Justice Ginsburg challenged the Court's reading of legislative intent in the case
stating that Congressional intent with regard to dominion of the methane gas, which was formerly considered to
be waste product of coal, was at least ambiguous and she "would therefore apply the canon that ambiguities in land
grants are construed in favor of the sovereign". . . a construction which would preserve the government's and,
therefore, the tribe's interest in it. Id.
122. 526 U.S. 473, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999).

123. See Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42 U.S.C. § 2011, as amended by Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (n)(o) (1994 & Supp. 1111997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (w)(the Act limits liability and provides insurance coverage
for claims against federal licenses for injuries resulting from "a nuclear incident")).
127. See El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 119 S.Ct. at 1437 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (hh) (1994)).
128. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 119 S. Ct. at 1437.
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F. Debtor-Creditor
In the two debtor-creditor cases this term, creditors won one and lost one. A
divided Court in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnershipt29 invoked the absolute priority rule' against equity
security holders in a debtor association and refused to allow them exclusive rights
to equity securities in the new entity created by a proposed reorganization plan. 3'
The Court reasoned that the plan did not give a dissenting senior class of creditors
the opportunity either to become equity holders in the new entity or to propose an
alternative plan. t32 In so ruling, the Court relied on language in the applicable
section of the Bankruptcy Code which bars junior interests (here, the equity
holders) from receiving property in the new entity "on account of' the junior
interests. 133 The Court interpreted "on account of' to mean "because of' and thereby
sustained the bank-creditor's objection to the "cramdown" reorganization plan.'34
Creditors prevailed with this interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code but lost an
attempt to obtain injunctive relief against prejudgment debtors in the other debtorcreditor case, Grupo Mexicano de De Sarollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.'
In Alliance, investment fund creditors purchased unsecured notes from a
Mexican holding company involved in toll road construction under the auspices of
the Mexican government. 36 A downturn in the Mexican economy had the ripple
effect of putting the Mexican company in an insolvent position. 37 Fearing
dissipation of the debtor's remaining assets, the note-holder-creditors accelerated
the principal and filed suit for judgment on the notes and for a preliminary
injunction blocking any transfer of the debtor's remaining assets during the

129. 526 U.S. 434, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
130. The absolute priority rule in bankruptcy cases is ajudge made rule that predated the Bankruptcy Code and
interpreted its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act, to require reorganization plans to be "fair and equitable" to
creditors. Recognizing the dominant position of management in developing a reorganization plan, the Courts
developed the "absolute priority rule, which stated that fairness and equity required that 'the creditors ... be paid
before stockholders could retain [equity interests] for any purpose whatever."' Id. at 1416 (quoting Northern Pac.
R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 500 (1913)). In the instant case, former partners (equity security holders) of the
bankrupt devised the Plan which excluded senior interest holders (creditors) from owning interests in the
reorganized debtor. The bank, as creditor, opposed and blocked confirmation of the Plan. Consequently, the debtor
invoked § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code which is known as the "cramdown" process which would permit
approval of the plan over dissent if, interalia, the plan was found to be "fair and equitable" with respect to each
dissenting class of impaired unsecured claims. § 1129(b)(c). Id. at 1415. The bank's mortgage could not be
completely satisfied by the bankrupt's assets. Id. at 1415. The remaining deficiency qualified it as a dissenting
class of impaired unsecured claims, thus triggering the "fair and equitable' requirement of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
which was characterized in the legislative history of the Code as a "'partial codification of the absolute priority
rule."' Id. at 1419.
131. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1419.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 1420-24.
134. See note 130, supra.
135. 527 U.S. 308, 119 S. Ct. 1961 (1999).

136. See id. at 1963.
137. See id. at 1964-65.
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pendency of the action.'38 Subsequently, the note-holder creditors prevailed on the
merits of the
case and the preliminary injunction was converted to a permanent
139
injunction.
On writ of certiorari from the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court, by a
plurality, declared that the preliminary injunction was premature.14 District courts
historically have not had the equitable power to impose a preliminary injunction
prior to a judgment on the debt. 4' The Court rejected creditors' argument that the
final result in the case established the debt, converted the preliminary injunction
into a permanent injunction and thereby rendered the issue moot. 42 The Court did
concede that, "[g]enerally, an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction
becomes moot when the trial court enters a permanent injunction." 14 3 But where, as
here, the trial court had no authority to issue the preliminary injunction, "the final
injunction does not establish the substantive validity of the preliminary one."
The authority of district courts to enjoin conduct preliminarily under Rule 65
has been consistently constrained by "'traditional principles of equity
jurisdiction."" 4 5 In the instant context, the well-established rule is that "a judgment
establishing a debt is necessary before a court of equity will interfere with the
debtor's use of his property."' 46 Invoking general principles ofjudicial restraint, the
Court refused to extend the district court's equitable powers in this context. 47 In
so ruling, it declined to adopt the dissent's invocation of broader principles of
equity in recognition of the untenable "Catch-22" position the decision presented
to creditors. The Court opined, "[w]hen there are indeed new conditions that might
call for a wrenching departure from past practice, Congress is in a better position
' 48
than we both to perceive them and to design the appropriate remedy.'
G. Patent Law
The Court rendered an important patent law decision of broad application last
term, when it was asked to determine what standard of review the Federal Circuit
must use in reviewing finding of facts issued by the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") 1 49
Over the objection of three dissenters, the Court found that the
applicable standard of review was delineated in § 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 50 Section 706 establishes that "'a reviewing court shall..

138. See id. at 1964.

139. See id. at 1964.
140. See Grupo, 119 S. Ct. at 1975.

141. See id. at 1974.
142. See id. at 1965.
143. Id. at 1966.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1968 (quoting11A CHARLESALANWRIGHTETAL,FEDERALPRACICEANDPROCEDURE § 2941 (2d
ed. 1995)).
146. Grupo, 119 S. Ct. at 1969 (199 9 ).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 1969.
149. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999)
150. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551.
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.(2) ...set aside agency findings ...found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious,... an
abuse of discretion or ... (E) unsupported by substantial evidence ... on the
record.'.'. The Court's decision dilutes the Federal Circuit's authority to review
PTO findings. It expressly rejected the Circuit's argument that APA's § 559
"clearly erroneous standard" is the applicable rule. 52 That section permits an
exception to § 706 and states that the APA does "'not limit or repeal additional
requirements recognized by law."' 15 3 In sum, the decision enhances the deference
the Circuit must show PTO findings.
In Pfaffv. Wells Electronic,Inc.,54 the other patent case last term, a patentee
marketed commercial quantities of his computer chip socket for over a year before
applying for its patent."' He subsequently sought protection of his patent from a
competitor's infringement.15 6 A unanimous Court gave a close reading to § 102 of
the Patent Act157and found that his pre-patent sales ran afoul of § 102's on-sale bar,
thereby rendering his patent invalid.'5 8
H. Taxation
An important state franchise tax case was decided last term. In South Central
Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama,5 9 a unanimous result was reached striking down
Alabama's franchise tax regime.16 The statute taxed Alabama corporations at the
rate of 1% of the par value of the corporation's stock. 6 ' Yet, it imposed a tax of
0.3% of actual capital employed in Alabama on foreign corporations domesticated
and doing business in Alabama. 62 The discrepancy in tax rates discriminated
against foreign corporations in derogation of interstate commerce, said the Court.
Therefore, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause. 63
The Court rejected Alabama's Eleventh Amendment argument that federal
court jurisdiction does not "extend to any suit" brought against a state by citizens
of another state."6 The Court cited its own recent precedent on the issue to the
effect that where, as here, the state court "takes cognizance of a case, the State
'6 5
assents to appellate review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the case."'

151.
152.
153.
154.

Section 706 (quoted in Dickinson, 119 S. Ct. at 1818).
See Dickinson, 119 S. CL at 1824.
Id. at 1819.
525 U.S. 55, 119 S. Ct. 304 (1999).

155. See id. at 307-08.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 304.
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
Pfaff, 119 S.CL at312.
526 U.S. 160, 119 S. Ct. 1180 (1999).
See id. at 1186.
See id,at 1182.

162. See id.
163. See id.
at 1185.
164. Id. at 1184.
165. South Central Bell, at 1184 (quotingMcKesson Corp.v.Div.of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco,Dept.
of Bus.Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 30 (1990)). The Court also recently held inFultonv. Faulkner,516

U.S.325 (1996),that North Carolina's intangibles tax system which discriminated against foreign Corporations
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. See Barbara K.Bucholtz,Taking Care of Business,supranote 4,at 458.
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166
The Court rejected Alabama's suggestion that it overrule this recent precedent.

I. Civil Practice
Several interesting civil practice cases implicating business interests appeared
on the Court's 1998-1999 docket. In Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,6 7 the
Court revisited its Daubert16' expert witness rule. In Daubertthe Court held that
69
expert scientific testimony is admissible only if it is "both relevant and reliable,"
170
and it assigned a "gatekeeper" role to the trial court to make that determination.
In Kumho Tire the Court, over one dissent, extended the Daubert rule to the
testimony of other experts who are not scientists.'
The expert testimony at issue in Kumho Tire was that of an engineer with
expertise in determining the causes of tire failure. 7 ' The trial court rejected the
engineer's methodology and excluded his testimony on the grounds of unreliability,
pursuant to Rule 702, Fed. R. Evid. 173 In so doing, it applied Daubert'sreliability
factors including: 1) theory verification; 2) peer review or publication of the theory;
3) percentage of error; and 4) acceptance in the relevant community of experts.' 74
The Court first determined that Rule 702 applies to the reliability of all
evidence; likewise Daubertextends to all expert testimony. 75 The Court, however,
declined either to limit or to expand the number of factors a court might consider
in applying Daubert, concluding that, "[t]oo much depends upon the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue." 176 Commentators agree that the case
will impact the use of dueling experts in product liability cases. 177 Whether the
decision is favorable to business interests depends, of course, on whose ox - or
expert - is being gored.
A removal and remand case of some import came before the Court last term.
In Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 78 subsidiaries of Marathon Oil entered a
sales agreement with Ruhrgas A.G. for gas produced by the subsidiaries in the
North Sea.' 79 The agreement contained a dispute resolution clause providing for

166. In another state taxation case, Arizona DepartmentofRevenue v. Blaze ConstructionCo.. 526 U.S. 32,119

S. Ct. 957 (1999), a unanimous Court held that a non-Indian federal contractor had no tax unity from income it
received under its contact with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (BIA) to construct and
repair roads on Indian reservations. Only the federal government itselfor an instrumentality closely tied to itenjoys
such immunity. Id. at 959-6 1.
167. 526 U.S. 137,119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

169. Id. at 2799.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1171.
See id
See idL
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1173.
See id. at 1174.
Id. at 1175.
April 5,1999 at B 1.
Marcia Coyle, Kumho Tire ClarifiesUse ofDaubert, NAT'L L.J.,
526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563 (1999).

179. See id at 1567.
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arbitration in Sweden. 18' However, when a dispute arose, Marathon, and others,
sued in Texas state court alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and related state
law claims. Ruhrgas removed the case to federal court where it moved to dismiss
for want of personal jurisdiction. 8' Marathon moved to remand arguing lack of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 8 ' The district court found that Ruhrgas had
insufficient contacts with Texas to meet its long-arm statute requirements and it
dismissed the case on personal jurisdiction grounds.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and, thereby, clarified its recent
holding in Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a BetterEnvironment.'83 During its 1997-1998
term, the Court in Steel held that Article Il constraints generally dictate that a court
must first find that it has subject-matter jurisdiction before it addresses the merits
of a case.' 84 However, Ruhrgasinvolved the pre-trial issue of personal jurisdiction.
The Court declared that, "[a]lthough the character of the two jurisdictional bedrocks
unquestionably differs, the distinctions do not mean that subject-matterjurisdiction
is ever and always the more 'fundamental.' Personal jurisdiction, too, is an
essential element of district court jurisdiction ... ,,85 Furthermore, Steel's
"jurisdiction 'before the merits' principle does not dictate the sequencing of
jurisdictional issues."' 86 Therefore, where the resolution of the personal jurisdiction
issue is straight-forward and clear (as it was in Ruhrgas), while the subject-matter
issue is complex and nuanced (as it was in Ruhrgas), the district court does not
abuse its discretion in resolving the jurisdictional question on the basis of personal
jurisdiction.8 7
In another removal and remand case, a divided Court held that a faxed filestamped copy of the complaint was not proper notice for purposes of determining
the thirty day removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 8 8 The language of §
1446(b) specifies removal notice "through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
complaint." A certified copy, but not a faxed copy satisfies § 1446(b). 89
J. Antitrust
An important antitrust case was considered by the Court last term. Nynex
Corp. v. Discon, Inc. 90 continues a discernable trend in Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence to limit the reach ofper se violations of the Sherman Act. Just two
terms ago, the Court in State Oil Co. v. Khan'9' overruled precedent and held that

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. at 1565.
See id.
See id
523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
See generally id.
Ruhrgas, 119 S. Ct. at 1565.
Id. at 1566.
Id.
Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 119 S. Ct. 1322 (1999).
Id. at 1323-25.
525 U.S. 128, 119 S. Ct. 493 (1998).
522 U.S. 3, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
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vertical maximum price caps are not per se violations of the Sherman Act. 9 2 The
Court justified its decision on the grounds that per se bans are increasingly
disfavored because they rest on theoretical constructs rather than on demonstrable
evidence of impermissable trade restraint.1 9
In keeping with the Khan approach, a unanimous Nynex Court held that the
per se rule in group boycott cases is limited to horizontal agreements.' 94 Nynex,
however, concerned a single competitior and a vertical agreement. In Nynex, a
supplier of telephone equipment removal services (Discon) filed an antitrust claim
against a subsidiary of Nynex which had previously purchased Discon's services
but had switched to another supplier, Discon's competitor. 9 5 Discon alleged that
the switch was made in order to harm Discon and that the competitor charged higher
rates than Discon.'96 Discon argued the evidence showed the switch offered no
price advantage for the Nynex subsidiary and was obviously anti-competitive. 97
The Court found the facts did not state a case for aperse ban. To be entitled
to a per se ban in this context, Discon would have to prove harm "not just to a
single competitor, but to the competitive process itself."'9 8 Further, to apply theper
se ban under these facts "would subject cases involving business behavior that is
improper for various reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique" to
per se antitrust liability and treble damages, thereby curtailing the business
community's freedom to change suppliers even though no damage to the trade has
been found.""' Indeed, "[t]he freedom to switch suppliers lies close to the heart of
the competitive process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage."20 0 Nynex is a
decision that is entirely consistent with and further develops recent antitrust
doctrine.
On the whole, then, last term's business-related decisions reinforce the profile
of the Rehnquist Court whose moderately pro-business decisions are reached
primarily by a strong consensus and predominantly by a close reading of precedent
and applications of technical rules of statutory construction. Finally, there were last
term's federalism cases. To what extent do these cases break the mold and to what
extent can we forecast their impact on business interests?
K. FederalismCases
Undoubtedly, this term's highly divisive federalism cases will distinguish it.
At one level, these cases do signal a departure from previous terms in which there
was abundant evidence that the Court was making a conscious effortin its choice of

192. See generally id.
193. For a more complete analysis of Khan, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, "Sticking to Business": A Review of
Business-RelatedCases in the 1997-1998 Supreme Court Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 207,225-26 (1999).

194. Nynex, 119 S. Ct. at 498.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 496.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 498.

199. Id.
200. Nynex, 119 S. Ct. at 499.
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cases and in its technical approach to case resolution to avoid wedge issues or flash
points that might widen pre-existing ideological dichotomies in the Court and in
society.
Certainly, a consensus-building and technocratic demeanor would seem to be
appropriate for a conservative Court because that demeanor accords with this
Court's avowed precept that the Third Branch should be the weakest Branch. In
politically contentious times it would also seem to be a wise approach because, in
fact, the judiciary is the weakest branch: least able to withstand the brunt of
protracted ideological conflict.
On the other hand, it has been no secret that states' rights occupy a preeminent position on the Chief Justice's agenda. In that sense, the federalism cases
are no surprise but simply add to a growing body of dual sovereignty cases under
his watch.
The Rehnquist Court's first foray into dual sovereignty issues occurred in
1992. In New York v. United States,2"' the Court held that the federal law-level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutionally coerced
states into administering a federal program. Four years later, the Court in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida 2 held that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause
to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suits in federal
courts. °3 Building on the reasoning in those two cases, the Court in 1997, in the
case ofPrintzv. UnitedStates,2" held that interim background checking procedures
imposed on state law enforcement officers by the Brady Act2 5 constituted an
unconstitutional exercise of federal power over state officials which was not
authorized either by the Necessary and Proper Clause or by the Commerce
Clause.2°6 And that same year, in City ofBoerne v. Flores,0 7 the Court held that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congressional power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 0 8
With these precedents as prologue, a deeply-divided Court last term extended
the reasoning of Seminole Tribe to Alden v. Maine 9 and ruled that Congress had
no power to authorize private suits against states in state courts. A provision in the
Fair Labor Standards Act which purported to authorize these suits was, therefore,
unconstitutional. 0

201. 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
202. 517 U.S. 44, 117S. Ct. 2157 (1996).
203. See generally id.
204. 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
205. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Specifically, see § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(llI, IV),
(s)(2)).
206. See generallyPrintz, 117 S. Ct. 2365.
207. 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
208. See generally id.
209. 527 U.S. 706, 119S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
210. See generally id.
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By the same plurality, 211 the Court in College SavingsBank v.FloridaPrepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,212 struck down a provision in the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act holding that Congress impermissibly
attempted to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by subjecting states to lawsuits
brought pursuant to § 43 of the Landam Act and alleging false and misleading
advertising by the state. 13 Florida's otherwise lawful activity in marketing its
prepaid college tuition program, declared the Court, could not be constitutionally
challenged by competing business interests under the Lanham Act?1 4 The federal
government's sole power to authorize private suits against a state arises from its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 1 The competing business interest,
in this case a bank, did not qualify for Fourteenth Amendment protection because
there is simply no constitutionally-protected property right to market share. The
activity of doing business is not property at all.216 And, outside the parameter of
rights, only a state's express waiver of its immunity will
Fourteenth Amendment
21 7
authorize these suits.
In the instant case, the Court rejected the bank's constructive waiver
argument: that Florida constructively waived its sovereign immunity under the
applicable law when it entered interstate commerce with its marketing plan after
Congress passed the Trademark Act which purported to authorize the type of private
suit at issue in this case. 21 8 The state sovereignty trump does not necessarily inure
to the benefit of the business community: College Savings Bank is not good news
for business interests.
On the other hand, recall that the Court's emerging states' immunity dogma
was moderated to some extent by last term's franchise tax case, South CentralBell,
where the Court, on Commerce Clause grounds, struck down a state franchise tax
system challenged by a private litigant in state court. There, a unanimous Court
rejected the State's Eleventh Amendment argument. The Court said that once the
state court agrees to consider and rule in a case implicating a federal issue, the State
cannot raise the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to review by the Supreme Court.2" 9
Next term, the Court has agreed to hear a business-related dual sovereignty
case with an interesting spin: are Massachusetts "Burma Laws" - which require
state agencies to boycott private companies doing business in Myanmar (formerly

211. The vote in bothAlden v. Maineand in College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaid-PostsecondaryEducation

Expense Board was 5 to 4. In Alden, Justice Kennedy authored the opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas joined. Justice Souter wrote the dissent in which Justice Stevens, Breyer
and Ginsburg joined. Justice Scalia authored the opinion in College Savings Bank in which the Chief Justice and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas joined. Both Justices Stevens and Breyer authored dissents. Breyer's
dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg.
212. 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
213. See generally id.
214. See id. at 2222.
215. See id. at 2223.

216. See id. at 2223-25.
217. See id. at 2222, 2226.

218. See College Savings Bank; 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2225-31. (1999).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 159-66.
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Burma) - an impermissible intrusion into the federal realm of foreign policy?22 °
After next term we will undoubtedly know more about how business interests will
fare under the Court's evolving federalism jurisprudence. But the evidence to date
invites the prediction that federalism issues, in so far as they are business-related,
will prove a mixed blessing for the business community.
III. CONCLUSION
The headline-grabbing cases involving employment discrimination and
federalism issues appeared to be a wake-up call and a harbinger of a more insistent
conservation. In fact, from a business perspective, it was a business as ususal
"Rehnquistian" term: moderately pro-business but willing to subjugate business
interests in order to retain, if not expand, liberal precedent on employment
discrimination issues (on the one hand) and to discount business interests when
those interests run afoul of the Court's states' rights agenda (on the other hand).
One final puzzle remains: how far is the conservative wing of the Court
willing to go in advancing its states' rights "retro-lution" even at the risk of
exacerbating pre-existing ideological fault lines in the Court and in society?
Undoubtedly, the answer to that questions lies in the results of the next Presidential
election and in the next President's opportunity to make appointments to the High
Court.

220. Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, No. 99-474, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). Other dual sovereignty
cases on the current docketinclude U.S. v. Morrison,No. 99-5, 120 S.Ct. 605(1999) and Brzonkala v. Morrison,
No. 99-29, 120 S. Ct. 605 (1999) (both involving challenges to the federal Violence Against women Act); Mitchell
v..Helms, No. 98-1648, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) and Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.v. Doe, No. 99-62, 120 S. Ct. 494
(1999) (both involving separation of church and state issues). See generallyMarcia Coyle, Justices' DocketHeats
Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1999, at Al.
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